Company Profile · FY2025 10-K DE · NYSE
Deere & Co
cyclical mature-market
1836 2025
1836 John Deere founded
1849 Production boom
1858 Financial crisis
1918 Waterloo acquisition
1923 Tractor sales begin
1927 Combine harvester invention
1945 Post-war expansion
2000 Timberjack acquisition
2014 Workforce reduction
2020 Technology push begins
2023 Revenue peaks then declines
Wikipedia history · XBRL financial data

John Deere makes money by selling large, expensive machines to farmers and construction companies, then lending those same customers the money to pay for them. The equipment side covers four-wheel-drive tractors, combine harvesters, cotton pickers, excavators, road-building machines, and lawn equipment. The financial services side, called John Deere Financial, earns interest by financing the purchases of those machines through loans and leases. When a farmer buys a new row-crop tractor, Deere often sells them the machine and then collects monthly payments on it for years. That double revenue stream, equipment plus financing, is what makes this business unusual among manufacturers. The diagram below traces where the money goes.

How John Deere Makes Money
flowchart TD A["Equipment Sales $38.9B"] --> B["Customer Base: Farmers, Contractors, Forestry Operators"] B --> C["Dealer Network ~2,050 locations"] C --> A A --> D["Financing through John Deere Financial $5.7B income"] D --> E["Retail Notes & Wholesale Receivables"] E --> D A --> F["Parts, Service & Warranty Revenue"] F --> B A --> G["Technology Investment: Precision Tech, Connectivity, Data"] G --> H["Smart Solutions: Operations Center, Automation, Telematics"] H --> B D --> I["Retained Capital for Reinvestment"] I --> G

Five years of financial data tell a story with a clear peak in the middle and a sharp drop on both sides. Revenue climbed from $44.0 billion in 2021 to $61.3 billion in 2023, then fell back to $45.7 billion by 2025. That is nearly the same level as 2021, suggesting the boom years were driven by an unusual surge in farm demand rather than permanent growth.

Annual Revenue (USD Billions)
2021
$44.0B
2022
$52.6B
2023
$61.3B
2024
$51.7B
2025
$45.7B
Revenue peaked at $61.3B in fiscal 2023 and has fallen each year since, returning close to 2021 levels by fiscal 2025.

One number held up better than revenue during the downturn: gross margin. When revenue was rising fast in 2021 and 2022, gross margin was around 33 to 34 cents on every dollar of sales. By 2024, even as revenue fell sharply, gross margin had climbed to over 40 cents on the dollar. That means the company was keeping more profit from each sale even while selling fewer machines. In 2025 it slipped back slightly to about 38 cents, but still well above where it started.

33.9%
Gross Margin 2021
40.5%
Gross Margin 2024
Despite falling revenue, gross margin expanded significantly between 2021 and 2024, suggesting pricing power held even as volumes dropped.

Free cash flow, which is the actual cash the business generates after paying for its operations and equipment upkeep, stayed remarkably stable through the cycle. It was $6.9 billion in 2021, dropped to $3.6 billion in 2022 when costs surged, recovered to $7.1 billion in 2023, and remained at $6.1 billion in 2025 even as revenue fell hard. That resilience partly reflects the financial services division collecting loan repayments steadily regardless of whether new machine sales are up or down.

$6.1B
Free cash flow in fiscal 2025, even as revenue fell to near 2021 levels

Net debt improved dramatically over the period. In 2021, net debt sat at $35.8 billion. By 2025, it had fallen to $5.5 billion. Much of that 2021 figure reflected the financial services division carrying large loan portfolios on its books, so the comparison is not straightforward. Still, the direction is clear: the balance sheet is in better shape today than it was four years ago.

2023
crisis
The Peak and the Drop
Fiscal 2023 was the highest revenue year in company history at $61.3 billion. But farm income then weakened, interest rates stayed high, and farmers stopped replacing equipment at the same pace. By fiscal 2025, revenue had fallen $15.6 billion from that peak. The company also flagged higher customer loan defaults and more bad debt write-offs as farm conditions stayed weak into 2026.

The risks facing this business right now are specific and documented, not vague. The first is tariffs. New tariffs imposed on imports cost the company approximately $600 million in fiscal 2025. Additional tariffs were placed on skid steer loaders and compact track loaders imported from Mexico, and the company has no guarantee it will receive exemptions. Other countries may respond with their own tariffs on products Deere exports, squeezing profits from both directions.

Why Farm Cycles Hit Equipment Makers Hard
Farmers buy big machines when crop prices are high and their incomes are strong. When crop prices fall, farmers hold onto old equipment longer and delay new purchases. This means Deere's sales can drop sharply even if the company is doing everything right, simply because corn or soybean prices moved in the wrong direction.

The second risk is the farm cycle itself. Weak farm conditions in 2025 caused lower sales, higher dealer discounts, and more customers falling behind on loan payments. The company expects these problems to continue into 2026. A third risk sits inside the supply chain: rare earth minerals used in motors and batteries come mainly from China. Losing access to those materials could delay production and raise costs significantly.

What Right-to-Repair Means
Right-to-repair is the idea that if you own a machine, you should be able to fix it yourself or take it to any mechanic, not just the manufacturer's official dealers. Deere has historically limited repair information and parts to its authorized dealer network. Critics argue this forces farmers to pay higher prices for repairs and keeps competitors out of the service business.

The fourth documented risk is a legal one. The Federal Trade Commission and five state attorneys general filed a lawsuit claiming Deere illegally controls the repair market by restricting parts and repair information to authorized dealers. A separate class action lawsuit makes similar claims. If Deere loses, it may be forced to open up its repair network and could face substantial financial penalties. This matters because the parts and service business is a steadier source of revenue than new equipment sales.

$4.0B
Backlog orders for the Production and Precision Agriculture segment as of November 2025, down from $5.2B a year earlier

John Deere has been pushing hard into precision agriculture technology, including automated tractors, computer-vision sprayers that target individual weeds, and a digital platform called the John Deere Operations Center that connects machines in real time. The company calls this its Smart Industrial Operating Model and has set long-term goals it refers to as Leap Ambitions, targeting growth through automation, data services, and software sold on a recurring subscription basis. The idea is to move beyond pure equipment sales, which swing wildly with farm cycles, toward technology revenue that keeps coming in year after year.

Deere sells turf equipment through The Home Depot and Lowe's, which puts its lawn mowers on shelves next to competitors in a way that large farm tractors never are. That retail exposure adds a small but different kind of revenue sensitivity tied to housing markets and consumer spending.
The Bet
Deere's precision agriculture technology, things like autonomous tractors, data-driven sprayers, and the Operations Center software platform, has to become a meaningful, recurring revenue stream before the next deep farm downturn cuts into the core equipment business again. If farmers adopt these technology subscriptions widely, Deere gets a steadier income layer that softens the brutal swings of the equipment cycle. If adoption stays slow, or if competitors from outside the traditional farm equipment industry offer cheaper or better software tools, Deere remains almost entirely dependent on commodity prices and farm income it cannot control, and the margin improvements seen from 2021 to 2024 may not hold through a prolonged downturn.
Open question
John Deere sits at a genuine crossroads. Its core equipment business is deeply cyclical, proven by a $15.6 billion revenue drop in just two years. Its margins improved even as volumes fell, which suggests real pricing power. But tariffs, a right-to-repair lawsuit, weakening farm conditions, and dependence on Chinese rare earth minerals are all active pressures today, not future possibilities. Can John Deere convert enough farmers into paying technology subscribers, quickly enough, to cushion the next equipment downturn, or will the company remain as exposed to the farm cycle in 2030 as it was in 2025?
[1] Deere & Company 10-K fiscal year 2025, Item 1 Business
[2] Deere & Company 10-K fiscal year 2025, Item 1A Risk Factors
[3] XBRL financial data fiscal years 2021 through 2025
Compiled · 10-K · FY2025
Net Sales
$38.9B
Finance and Interest Income
$5.7B
Other Income
$1.0B
Net Sales is the largest revenue source at 85.2% of total.
XBRL · Revenue segments · FY2025
Revenue by segment (3-year view)
Net Sales
2023
$55.6B
2024
$44.8B
2025
$38.9B
Finance and Interest Income
2023
$4.7B
2024
$5.8B
2025
$5.7B
Other Income
2023
$1.0B
2024
$1.2B
2025
$1.0B
Gross Margin Trend (5-year)
2021 2025
Gross margin moved from 33.9% (2021) to 38.4% (2025).
Operating Cash Flow (5-year)
2021
$7.7B
2022
$4.7B
2023
$8.6B
2024
$9.2B
2025
$7.5B
Cash Conversion
1.48×
At 1.48×, the company converts more than $1 of cash for every $1 it earns, a sign that reported earnings are backed by real cash coming in the door.
XBRL · 10-K Financial Statements · FY2025
FY2025
$5.5B
↓ 11% year over year
FY2024
$6.2B
Net debt fell 11% year over year, the company is paying down more than it's taking on.
XBRL · Balance Sheet · 10-K · FY2025
Mr. May
Chief Executive Officer
$28M
DEF 14A · Proxy Statement
Jan 14, 2026
Reed Cory J
Pres, Life Sol Cust Sup & S.M.
Planned
$6.12M
Jan 8, 2026
May John C II
Chairman & CEO
Planned
$7.76M
Jan 8, 2026
May John C II
Chairman & CEO
Planned
$6.24M
Jan 8, 2026
May John C II
Chairman & CEO
Planned
$4.13M
Jan 8, 2026
May John C II
Chairman & CEO
Planned
$2.67M
Nov 25, 2025
May John C II
Chairman & CEO
Planned
$5.55M
Feb 18, 2025
Kalathur Rajesh
President, JD Financial & CIO
Planned
$8.83M
Feb 18, 2025
Kalathur Rajesh
President, JD Financial & CIO
Planned
$3.48M
No open-market purchases and 8 sales, insiders have been net sellers over the past two years.
Form 4 · SEC filings · Last 24 months
Vanguard Group
8.3%
BlackRock
6.0%
State Street
3.9%
JPMorgan Asset Mgmt
3.5%
T. Rowe Price
2.9%
Morgan Stanley
1.6%
Northern Trust
1.0%
Goldman Sachs
0.7%
Vanguard Group is the largest institutional holder with 8.3% of shares outstanding.
13F filings
Trade and Tariffs
New tariffs imposed on imports cost the company approximately $600 million in 2025. Additional tariffs were added on small-frame skid steer loaders and compact track loaders imported from Mexico, and the company is not guaranteed to get an exemption to reduce these costs. Retaliatory tariffs from other countries may continue to hurt profits from exported products.
Agricultural Market Cycles
The company's sales depend heavily on farm income and agricultural prices, which are controlled by factors outside its control like commodity prices, interest rates, and government policies. In 2025, weak farm conditions caused lower sales, higher discounts, and more unpaid customer bills, and the company expects these problems to continue in 2026.
Supply Chain and Raw Materials
The company relies on rare earth minerals sourced mainly from China for motors and batteries, and losing access to these materials could seriously damage the business. Parts shortages, supplier financial problems, and transportation disruptions have caused production delays and higher costs, and these risks are expected to continue.
Financing and Credit Risk
The company's financial services division provides financing for a large portion of worldwide sales but has experienced higher customer defaults and bad debt write-offs in 2025 due to weak farm conditions. The division depends on accessing affordable funding, and if it cannot, the company's ability to finance customer purchases will be harmed.
Right-to-Repair Litigation
The Federal Trade Commission and five state attorneys general filed a lawsuit claiming the company illegally monopolizes repair services by limiting parts and repair information to authorized dealers. A separate class action lawsuit makes similar claims. If the company loses, it may be forced to change its business model and could pay substantial damages.
10-K Item 1A · Risk Factors
Cash vs earnings
AR growth
Inventory
Share dilution
Debt trend
One-time charges
Goodwill
Customer conc.
Goodwill and intangibles are 121% of total assets, the business depends on past acquisitions delivering returns.
10-K · XBRL · Computed signals