Goldman Sachs makes money by sitting in the middle of financial activity. When a big company wants to merge with another company, Goldman Sachs advises on the deal and earns a fee. When a company wants to raise money from the public, Goldman Sachs helps run that process and earns another fee. When large investors need to buy or sell stocks, bonds, or other financial instruments quickly, Goldman Sachs acts as the buyer or seller in between, earning a small spread on each transaction. It also manages money for wealthy people and institutions, charging fees based on how much money it oversees. These four streams, advisory fees, trading spreads, underwriting fees, and asset management fees, come together across three main business units: Global Banking and Markets, Asset and Wealth Management, and Platform Solutions. The diagram below traces where the money goes.
Five years of data tell a story of a business that swings hard with market conditions. Revenue peaked at $59.3 billion in 2021, a year when financial markets were booming and deal activity was exceptionally high. Then it fell to $47.4 billion in 2022 and $46.3 billion in 2023, as rising interest rates cooled deal making and markets turned choppy. Revenue has since climbed back, reaching $53.5 billion in 2024 and $58.3 billion in 2025. That recovery was driven by a jump in investment banking activity, a 68% rise in net interest income, and growing fees from managing more assets. Net earnings followed the same pattern, rising from $8.5 billion in 2023 to $14.3 billion in 2024 and then $17.2 billion in 2025.
Profitability improved sharply at the top of the income statement. Return on equity, a measure of how much profit the company generates from the money shareholders have put in, rose from 7.5% in 2023 to 12.7% in 2024 and then 15.0% in 2025. Goldman Sachs has stated a target of reaching between 14% and 16% return on equity through a full economic cycle, and 2025 was the first year in this data set where it hit that range. Diluted earnings per share, which is the profit per unit of ownership after accounting for all shares, jumped from $22.87 in 2023 to $51.32 in 2025.
One strategic move stands out in this five-year window. Goldman Sachs spent several years trying to build a consumer banking business, offering the Apple Card credit card and personal loans under the Marcus brand. That experiment did not go as planned. By 2025, the company had transferred its entire Apple Card loan portfolio to held-for-sale status, meaning it was getting out of that business. The exit caused markdowns and contract termination costs that dragged down the Platform Solutions segment. However, releasing the reserves that had been set aside for credit card losses generated a net benefit of $1.11 billion in the provision for credit losses line in 2025, partially softening the blow.
Looking at the cash flow picture adds important nuance. Operating cash flow was positive in 2021 and 2022, at $6.3 billion and $8.7 billion respectively. But it turned sharply negative in 2023, 2024, and 2025, reaching negative $45.2 billion in 2025. Free cash flow followed the same direction, hitting negative $47.2 billion in 2025. For a trading-heavy financial firm, large swings in operating cash flow often reflect changes in trading asset balances and collateral posted rather than deteriorating earnings. Still, the scale of the negative numbers and the growth in net debt from essentially zero in 2023 to $121.2 billion in 2025 are figures worth watching carefully.
That borrowing dependency is one of the clearest risks in the business. Goldman Sachs must access credit markets continuously to fund its operations. If those markets freeze or if the company's creditworthiness comes into question, it could face serious pressure to sell assets quickly or shrink its operations. Market risk is just as direct: revenues from trading and asset management fees fall when asset prices drop, because the company loses money on positions it holds and earns less in fees on a smaller pool of assets. A third risk is concentration in counterparties. Goldman Sachs does business with many large financial institutions and borrowers. If a major counterparty fails to pay what it owes, the losses can be significant.
There is also a regulatory layer that most businesses do not face. Goldman Sachs is a bank holding company. Banking regulators can restrict how much money its subsidiary banks and brokers send up to the parent company. If regulators decide those subsidiaries need to hold more capital, the parent could find itself short of cash to pay dividends or meet debt obligations, even if the overall enterprise is profitable. On top of that, the company carries ongoing legal and regulatory exposure. The 1MDB scandal in Malaysia remains part of its history, and net provisions for litigation and regulatory proceedings were $215 million in 2025 alone.
Market making brought in $17.99 billion in 2025, nearly a third of total revenue. Investment banking added $9.35 billion, up 21% from the year before as merger and acquisition volumes rose. Investment management contributed $11.75 billion, growing as the value of assets under supervision increased. These three streams together show where the business concentrates its bets: on the health of financial markets, the confidence of corporate decision makers, and the direction of asset prices.
In late 2025, Goldman Sachs announced a multi-year initiative called OneGS 3.0, described as a transformation of its operating model intended to drive expense efficiencies and create capacity for future growth. Total operating expenses were $37.54 billion in 2025, with compensation and benefits alone at $18.91 billion. The company also recognized $250 million in severance costs in 2025 related to headcount reduction efforts. Whether OneGS 3.0 produces meaningful cost savings, or simply reflects the normal friction of running a large financial firm, is not yet visible in the numbers.