Company Profile · FY2026 10-K HD · NYSE
Home Depot, Inc.
per-transaction mature-market
1978 2025
1978 Home Depot Founded
1979 First Stores Open
1981 Goes Public on Stock Market
1989 Becomes Largest in United States
2002 Enters Mexico Market
2007 CEO Change and Strategic Shift
2008 Housing Market Crash Begins
2014 New CEO Craig Menear Arrives
2020 COVID-19 Pandemic Boost
2024 SRS Acquires GMS
Wikipedia history · XBRL financial data

Home Depot runs 2,359 warehouse-style stores across the United States, Canada, and Mexico, selling everything from lumber and paint to appliances and garden supplies. Customers pay per transaction, either in store or online, and those transactions add up to the largest home improvement retail operation in the world. The company makes money two ways: from regular shoppers doing their own projects at home, and from professional contractors who buy in large volumes and need fast, reliable delivery. In 2024, Home Depot added a third channel by acquiring SRS, a distribution company that sells roofing materials, landscaping supplies, and pool products directly to specialty trade contractors through more than 1,250 branch locations. That move pushed the business beyond its orange-apron stores and into a network of professional trade supply. The diagram below traces where the money goes.

How Home Depot Makes Money
flowchart TD A["Customer Shopping DIY, DIFM, Pros"] --> B["Product Sales 159.0B"] A --> C["Services Installation, Rental"] B --> D["Gross Profit 33.3% margin"] C --> D D --> E["Operating Profit 12.7% margin"] E --> F["Capital Investment 3.7B capex annually"] F --> G["Store Network 2,359 locations"] G --> A F --> H["Supply Chain DCs, Fulfillment"] H --> A E --> I["Shareholder Returns 9.2B dividends"] D --> J["SRS Ecosystem 1,250+ locations Roofing, Pool, Landscape"] J --> A

Five years of financial data tell a clear story about where this business stands. Revenue grew from $151.2 billion in fiscal 2022 to $164.7 billion in fiscal 2026, but the path was not straight. Sales actually dipped to $152.7 billion in fiscal 2024 before recovering. The SRS acquisition, completed in fiscal 2024, added roughly $6.3 billion in incremental sales in fiscal 2026 alone, meaning the core store business was essentially flat during this stretch. The underlying home improvement market softened as high interest rates made homeowners reluctant to take on big renovation projects. Comparable sales, which measures only existing stores and websites, fell 3.2% in fiscal 2023, then fell another 1.8% in fiscal 2024, before recovering to a modest 0.3% gain in fiscal 2025.

Net Revenue ($ Billions)
FY2022
$151.2B
FY2023
$157.4B
FY2024
$152.7B
FY2025
$159.5B
FY2026
$164.7B
Revenue dipped in fiscal 2024 before recovering, with the SRS and GMS acquisitions contributing meaningfully to fiscal 2025 and 2026 growth.

Gross margin has been remarkably stable, holding in a narrow band between 33.3% and 33.6% across all five years. That consistency shows the company has pricing discipline even when costs shift. But operating profit as a share of sales has been sliding. Operating income was 14.2% of net sales in fiscal 2023, dropped to 13.5% in fiscal 2024, and fell further to 12.7% in fiscal 2025. Higher payroll costs, growing interest payments on acquisition debt, and the lower-margin SRS distribution business are all pulling that number down. Net debt has climbed sharply, from $35.3 billion in fiscal 2022 to $49.4 billion in fiscal 2026, a direct consequence of funding the SRS and GMS deals.

$35.3B
Net Debt FY2022
$49.4B
Net Debt FY2026
Debt rose by $14.1 billion in four years, largely to fund the SRS acquisition in fiscal 2024 and the GMS acquisition completed in fiscal 2025.

Free cash flow has fluctuated rather than grown steadily. It was $16.6 billion in fiscal 2022, fell to $14.6 billion in fiscal 2023, jumped to $21.2 billion in fiscal 2024, then eased back to $19.8 billion in fiscal 2025 and $16.3 billion in fiscal 2026. The company returned $9.2 billion to shareholders through dividends in fiscal 2026 alone, and paused share repurchases to focus on paying down debt from the acquisitions. The return on invested capital, a measure of how efficiently the company uses the money tied up in the business, fell from 36.7% in fiscal 2023 to 25.7% in fiscal 2026, reflecting the large amount of new capital absorbed by SRS and GMS.

25.7%
Return on invested capital in fiscal 2026, down from 36.7% three years earlier as acquisition debt expanded the capital base
What 'Pro' customers mean for this business
Professional contractors, called Pros, are a small share of total customer count but account for a large share of spending. Pros buy in bulk, order repeatedly, and need fast delivery to job sites. Winning more Pro spending is a higher-stakes game than winning DIY shoppers, because each Pro relationship is worth far more per year and Pros tend to stick with suppliers they trust.

The entire growth strategy now hinges on serving professional contractors better than anyone else. Home Depot is not just adding stores anymore. It is building a distribution network, a loyalty program called Pro Xtra, dedicated sales teams, trade credit products, and AI-powered project planning tools, all aimed at making professional contractors choose Home Depot for every purchase on every job. The SRS and GMS acquisitions pushed that vision further by adding roofing products, drywall, steel framing, ceilings, landscaping supplies, and pool products delivered directly to job sites. Online sales, which represented 15.9% of total net sales in fiscal 2026, grew 8.7% compared to the prior year, with much of that growth tied to Pro-facing digital tools.

2024
milestone
SRS Acquisition Reshapes the Business
Home Depot acquired SRS Distribution in fiscal 2024 for roughly $10 billion, adding a specialty trade distribution business with over 1,250 locations. SRS then completed the acquisition of GMS in fiscal 2025, adding drywall, steel framing, ceilings, and complementary interior construction products. Together, these deals turned Home Depot from a pure retailer into a hybrid retailer and professional building materials distributor, a structural shift that changes how the company competes and how it earns money.

Several documented threats could disrupt this picture. Home Depot sources products from suppliers around the world, and the company's own filings note that tariffs created increased costs in fiscal 2026. Management says it mitigated the impact through supply chain diversification and some price increases, but trade policy remains unpredictable. The company also relies heavily on computer systems for inventory, ordering, payments, and online sales. A cyberattack or major system failure could prevent the company from processing orders entirely. Data security is a related concern: Home Depot collects personal information from millions of customers and employees, and a breach could trigger lawsuits, fines, and loss of trust. The installation services business, where Home Depot acts as a general contractor using third-party workers, has previously drawn scrutiny from regulators and carries ongoing compliance risk.

$49.4B
Net debt at end of fiscal 2026, with $4.6 billion of senior notes due within 12 months and future interest payments totaling $25.4 billion
Why housing market conditions matter so much
Home Depot's sales are tied closely to the housing market. When interest rates are high, fewer people move house, and fewer homeowners take on big renovation projects because they feel less wealthy or cannot afford loans. When rates fall, housing activity tends to pick up, which drives demand for flooring, kitchens, bathrooms, and all the other products Home Depot sells. The company's management specifically named a 'persisting high interest rate environment' as a pressure on home improvement demand in fiscal 2026.

The biggest strategic investment in the last five years rests on one question that remains unanswered: can a retailer built around orange-aproned store associates and DIY shoppers successfully become the preferred supplier for complex professional construction projects? SRS and GMS operate very differently from Home Depot stores. They deliver specialty materials directly to job sites on contractor schedules, serve a narrower set of trade customers, and compete in markets where relationships and reliability matter more than store experience. Blending those businesses together while keeping the core retail operation healthy is a management challenge that has not yet been proven out.

Home Depot paused share repurchases in March 2024 and does not plan to resume them in fiscal 2027, as it focuses on reducing the debt taken on to fund SRS and GMS. About $11.7 billion of a $15 billion repurchase authorization remains unused.
The Bet
Home Depot's expanded business works only if professional contractors become loyal, repeat customers across roofing, interiors, landscaping, pools, and general building materials, and not just at the orange-apron stores but through SRS and GMS branches too. If Pros spread their spending across multiple distributors rather than consolidating with Home Depot, the billions spent on SRS, GMS, Pro loyalty programs, dedicated sales forces, and delivery infrastructure will not generate the revenue growth needed to justify the new debt load. The core retail business has shown it can weather downturns, but the new distribution layer has yet to prove it can capture enough Pro wallet share to move the overall revenue needle beyond what acquisitions alone deliver.
Open question
Home Depot is a mature retailer with a stable core business that generates tens of billions in cash each year. Its recent acquisitions have changed the shape of that business in ways that are still playing out. The housing market remains under pressure from high interest rates, comparable store sales grew only 0.3% in fiscal 2026, and net debt has climbed $14 billion in four years. Can the SRS and GMS distribution businesses grow fast enough to justify the debt taken on to buy them, or has Home Depot paid a premium price to enter professional trade distribution just as the construction cycle softens?
Compiled · 10-K · FY2026
Total Revenue (5-year)
2022
$151B
2023
$157B
2024
$153B
2025
$160B
2026
$165B
Revenue grew from $151B in 2022 to $165B in 2026, a 9% increase over 5 years.
XBRL · Total revenue · Segment breakdown not reported separately
Gross Margin Trend (5-year)
2022 2026
Gross margin moved from 33.6% (2022) to 33.3% (2026).
Operating Cash Flow (5-year)
2022
$17B
2023
$15B
2024
$21B
2025
$20B
2026
$16B
Cash Conversion
1.15×
At 1.15×, the company converts more than $1 of cash for every $1 it earns, a sign that reported earnings are backed by real cash coming in the door.
XBRL · 10-K Financial Statements · FY2026
FY2026
$49B
↑ 5% year over year
FY2025
$47B
Net debt was roughly stable year over year.
XBRL · Balance Sheet · 10-K · FY2026

Executive compensation data not available.

DEF 14A · Proxy Statement
Mar 4, 2026
McPhail Richard V
EVP & CFO
Disc.
$0.94M
Mar 4, 2026
Deaton John A.
EVP, Supply Chain & Prod. Dev
Disc.
$0.66M
Dec 26, 2025
Roseborough Teresa Wynn
EVP, Gen. Counsel & Corp. Sec.
Disc.
$0.91M
Dec 26, 2025
Roseborough Teresa Wynn
EVP, Gen. Counsel & Corp. Sec.
Disc.
$0.09M
Dec 12, 2025
BROWN ANGIE
EVP & CIO
Disc.
$0.70M
Dec 11, 2025
Campbell Ann Marie
Senior EVP
Disc.
$0.05M
Sep 12, 2025
Bastek William D
EVP, Merchandising
Disc.
$0.97M
Aug 22, 2025
Roseborough Teresa Wynn
EVP, Gen. Counsel & Corp. Sec.
Disc.
$1.70M
Aug 22, 2025
Roseborough Teresa Wynn
EVP, Gen. Counsel & Corp. Sec.
Disc.
$0.57M
Aug 22, 2025
Bastek William D
EVP, Merchandising
Disc.
$1.55M
2 purchases and 31 sales by insiders over the past two years.
Form 4 · SEC filings · Last 24 months
Vanguard Group
10.0%
BlackRock
7.2%
State Street
4.7%
Geode Capital Management
2.5%
Morgan Stanley
2.2%
Capital Research Global
1.5%
Fidelity (FMR LLC)
1.4%
Northern Trust
1.1%
Vanguard Group is the largest institutional holder with 10.0% of shares outstanding.
13F filings
Supply Chain Disruption
The company depends on getting products from suppliers around the world and delivering them to stores and customers. Disruptions from trade disputes, tariffs, port delays, labor strikes, geopolitical conflicts, or natural disasters could prevent the company from getting inventory in time, leading to lost sales and higher costs.
Technology System Failures
The company relies heavily on computer systems for ordering, inventory, payments, and online sales. If these systems fail, get hacked, or experience outages due to cyberattacks, power failures, or natural disasters, the company cannot process orders or serve customers, which would hurt sales and reputation.
Data Security and Privacy
The company collects personal information from customers, employees, and job applicants. If hackers steal this data or the company fails to protect it properly, the company could face lawsuits, government fines, loss of customer trust, and damage to its reputation.
Installation Services Compliance
The company provides installation services through third-party contractors and acts as a general contractor. The EPA previously investigated the company's practices and imposed requirements. Failure to follow licensing, permitting, background check, and oversight rules could result in fines, lawsuits, or loss of contractor licenses.
Strategic Investment Execution
The company is making large investments in new supply chain systems, stores, and digital capabilities to improve customer experience. If these projects cost more than expected, take too long to complete, or fail to deliver promised benefits, the company could waste money and fall behind competitors.
10-K Item 1A · Risk Factors
Cash vs earnings
AR growth
Inventory
Share dilution
Debt trend
One-time charges
Goodwill
Customer conc.
Money owed to the company is growing faster than sales.
10-K · XBRL · Computed signals