Financials · FY2025 10‑K ↗ MS · NYSE
Morgan Stanley
Net revenue
$71B
↑ 14% vs prior year
Gross margin
N/A
Net debt
N/A
Free cash flow
N/A
1935 2025
1935 Company founded
1962 Computer innovation
1997 Dean Witter merger
2001 9/11 impact
2003 Research misconduct fine
2004 Women discrimination settlement
2009 Smith Barney partnership
2013 Full ownership achieved
2018 Mesa West acquisition
2019 Solium Capital purchase
2020 E-Trade mega acquisition
2021 Eaton Vance acquisition
2025 Strong revenue growth
Wikipedia history · XBRL financial data

Morgan Stanley is a global financial services firm that makes money in three main ways: helping big companies and governments raise money or do deals, helping wealthy individuals manage their money, and managing investment funds. The Institutional Securities division earns fees every time it helps a company issue stock or bonds, advises on a merger, or trades securities for clients. The Wealth Management division earns a steady stream of fees based on how much client money it oversees. The Investment Management division earns fees for managing funds across stocks, bonds, and private markets. Because a big chunk of revenue comes from trading and deal-making, the whole machine runs faster when markets are active and slows down when they go quiet. The diagram below traces where the money goes.

How Morgan Stanley Makes Money
flowchart TD A["Client Assets & Deposits"] --> B["Institutional Securities: Underwriting, Trading, Advisory"] A --> C["Wealth Management: Advisor-led & Digital Services"] A --> D["Investment Management: Asset Management & Funds"] B -->|"Underwriting Fees Trading Revenue" | E["Total Revenue 70.6B"] C -->|"Advisory Fees Product Sales" | E D -->|"Management Fees Performance Fees" | E E --> F["Capital & Liquidity Management"] F --> G["Employee Talent 83K across 42 countries"] G --> B G --> C G --> D F --> H["Regulatory Capital Requirements"] H --> A

Five years of numbers tell a story of real growth, but also real volatility. Revenue fell from $59.8 billion in 2021 to $53.7 billion in 2022 when capital markets cooled sharply. It stayed flat in 2023 at $54.1 billion, then climbed to $61.8 billion in 2024 and reached $70.6 billion in 2025, the highest level in this five-year window. Net income applicable to Morgan Stanley rose from $8.5 billion in 2023 to $13.4 billion in 2024 to $16.9 billion in 2025. The expense efficiency ratio improved from 77% in 2023 to 71% in 2024 to 68% in 2025, meaning the firm kept more of each dollar it earned. Return on equity went from 9.4% in 2023 to 14.0% in 2024 to 16.6% in 2025. All three business segments improved their pre-tax margins over the same period. The direction is clearly upward, but 2022 is a reminder of how quickly the picture can change.

Net Revenue by Year ($B)
2021
$59.8B
2022
$53.7B
2023
$54.1B
2024
$61.8B
2025
$70.6B
Revenue dipped sharply in 2022, stayed flat in 2023, then accelerated through 2024 and 2025 as capital markets activity recovered.

The 2025 results were driven by all three divisions firing at once. Institutional Securities posted net revenues of $33.1 billion, up 18% from 2024, with equity trading revenues of $15.6 billion and investment banking revenues of $7.6 billion. Wealth Management brought in $31.8 billion in net revenues, adding $356 billion in net new assets and $160 billion in fee-based asset flows during the year. Total client assets across Wealth Management and Investment Management reached $9.3 trillion at year-end 2025, up from $7.9 trillion at the end of 2024. That is a lot of money to charge fees on, and the higher those balances sit, the more recurring revenue the firm collects regardless of how many deals get done.

$9.3T
Total client assets at December 31, 2025, across Wealth Management and Investment Management
Why operating cash flow swings so wildly
Banks and trading firms hold enormous inventories of financial instruments that count as assets or liabilities on their books. When those balances shift, the accounting shows up as huge swings in operating cash flow, even if the underlying business is healthy. This is why Morgan Stanley's reported operating cash flow moved from positive $34.0 billion in 2021 to negative $6.4 billion in 2022 to negative $33.5 billion in 2023, then back to positive $1.4 billion in 2024 and negative $17.9 billion in 2025. These swings reflect changes in trading positions, not the firm losing or making cash from its core fee businesses.

The operating cash flow numbers are hard to read in isolation because of how trading inventories move. What is easier to read is the direction of the underlying business. Revenue is at a five-year high. Margins are expanding. The firm cut its expense efficiency ratio by nine percentage points in three years. It also trimmed roughly 2% of its global workforce in early 2025, recording $144 million in severance costs, as part of a performance management action rather than a strategic retreat. The firm employs approximately 83,000 people across 42 countries, up from 80,000 at the end of 2024.

2020
milestone
The E-Trade acquisition reshapes Wealth Management
Morgan Stanley paid $13 billion for E-Trade in 2020, the largest bank acquisition in the United States since the 2008 financial crisis. This brought in a large self-directed retail investing platform and deepened the firm's reach beyond its traditional high-net-worth advisor model. Combined with the earlier Smith Barney acquisition and the 2021 purchase of Eaton Vance, Morgan Stanley assembled a Wealth Management and Investment Management engine that now generates $9.3 trillion in client assets and provides a large, recurring fee base that partially offsets the cyclical swings of trading and deal-making.

Several real risks sit underneath these strong results. The most direct is market risk. Trading revenues and deal fees depend on active markets. When stock prices fall sharply, companies stop doing deals, trading volumes shrink, and fee-based asset balances drop because they are tied to market values. The firm also carries credit risk: it lends money to corporations and against real estate, and in 2025 it set aside $349 million in provisions for credit losses, partly for specific commercial real estate loans. Cybersecurity is a named high-severity risk in the firm's own filings, because processing millions of transactions daily through complex technology systems creates real exposure to outages, breaches, and fines. Finally, as a firm that regulators classify as systemically important, Morgan Stanley must hold extra capital and file detailed plans for how it would be wound down in a crisis. In a bad enough scenario, regulators can restrict dividends and buybacks or require asset sales.

$349M
Provision for credit losses in 2025, partly tied to specific commercial real estate loans
What fee-based assets mean for stability
A fee-based asset is one where the client pays an annual percentage of the balance rather than a commission per trade. This creates recurring revenue that shows up every quarter regardless of trading activity. The more client money Morgan Stanley manages on a fee basis, the more its revenue resembles a subscription business rather than a pure transaction business. Fee-based asset flows of $160 billion in 2025 represent new money moving into these arrangements.

The structural story Morgan Stanley tells about itself is that it has transformed from a purely cyclical trading firm into an integrated model where recurring Wealth Management and Investment Management fees cushion the volatility of Institutional Securities. That cushion is real and growing. Wealth Management pre-tax margin reached 29.3% in 2025. Its return on tangible common equity reached 43%. But Institutional Securities still generated $33.1 billion of the firm's $70.6 billion in total net revenues in 2025. The trading and deal engine still dominates the top line.

$33.1B
Institutional Securities net revenues 2025
$31.8B
Wealth Management net revenues 2025
The two largest segments are now nearly equal in revenue, but Institutional Securities is still driven by market activity while Wealth Management revenue is more recurring.
Morgan Stanley's Wealth Management return on tangible common equity hit 43% in 2025, far above the 17% posted by Institutional Securities. The recurring fee model is more capital-efficient, which is part of why the firm has been pushing assets into fee-based accounts.
The Bet
Morgan Stanley's fee-based Wealth Management and Investment Management divisions keep growing fast enough, and hold their margins well enough, to make the firm's overall revenue and earnings less dependent on the trading and deal cycles that caused the 2022 revenue drop. If that shift keeps working, the firm looks more like a high-margin recurring-fee business sitting on top of a cyclical trading engine. If capital markets slow again before fee-based assets grow large enough to compensate, the revenue trajectory could reverse just as quickly as it did in 2022, even with $9.3 trillion in client assets on the books, because a market downturn would shrink those asset balances and the fees tied to them simultaneously.
Open question
Morgan Stanley has built a genuine and growing recurring-fee business alongside its cyclical trading and deal-making operations. The two largest divisions are now nearly equal in revenue, and margins are expanding across all three segments. The unresolved question is whether the Wealth Management and Investment Management divisions are now large enough and resilient enough to prevent another 2022-style revenue decline when markets inevitably cool, or whether the firm remains, at its core, a cyclical business with a large recurring-fee layer on top.
Compiled · 10-K · FY2025
Total Revenue (5-year)
2021
$60B
2022
$54B
2023
$54B
2024
$62B
2025
$71B
Revenue grew from $60B in 2021 to $71B in 2025, a 18% increase over 5 years.
XBRL · Total revenue · Segment breakdown not reported separately
Gross margin is not applicable for banks, they earn through interest spread and fees, not product sales.
Operating Cash Flow (5-year)
2021
$34B
2022
−$6.4B
2023
−$34B
2024
$1.4B
2025
−$18B
For banks, operating cash flow reflects loan origination and funding activity, not day-to-day profitability.
Cash Conversion
-1.06×
XBRL · 10-K Financial Statements · FY2025
FY2025
−$112B
↓ 6% year over year
FY2024
−$105B
Banks hold large amounts of debt by design, they borrow cheaply (deposits, bonds) and lend at higher rates. The gap between those two rates is how they make money. Net debt figures here reflect that funding structure, not financial stress.
XBRL · Balance Sheet · 10-K · FY2025
Edward Pick
Chief Executive Officer
$37M
Sharon Yeshaya
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
$19M
Andrew M. Saperstein
Co-President and Head of Wealth Management and Investment Management
$28M
Daniel A. Simkowitz
Co-President and Head of Institutional Securities
$28M
Eric F. Grossman*
Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer and Chief Administrative Officer
$19M
DEF 14A · Proxy Statement
Apr 20, 2026
GROSSMAN ERIC F
Chief Legal/Admin Officer
$1.06M
Apr 20, 2026
GROSSMAN ERIC F
Chief Legal/Admin Officer
$1.06M
Apr 17, 2026
SIMKOWITZ DANIEL A
Co-President
$2.78M
Apr 16, 2026
SAPERSTEIN ANDREW M
Co-President
$1.23M
Apr 16, 2026
SAPERSTEIN ANDREW M
Co-President
$6.32M
Apr 16, 2026
SAPERSTEIN ANDREW M
Co-President
$1.20M
Apr 16, 2026
SAPERSTEIN ANDREW M
Co-President
$0.27M
Apr 16, 2026
SAPERSTEIN ANDREW M
Co-President
$0.61M
Apr 16, 2026
SAPERSTEIN ANDREW M
Co-President
$0.12M
Apr 16, 2026
CRAWLEY MANDELL
Chief Client Officer
$0.48M
No open-market purchases and 57 sales, insiders have been net sellers over the past two years.
Form 4 · SEC filings · Last 24 months
MITSUBISHI UFJ FINANCIAL GROUP INC
24.0%
Vanguard Group
7.6%
State Street
6.4%
BlackRock
5.4%
Geode Capital Management
1.8%
Fidelity (FMR LLC)
1.4%
Capital Research Global
1.3%
T. Rowe Price
1.1%
MITSUBISHI UFJ FINANCIAL GROUP INC is the largest institutional holder with 24.0% of shares outstanding.
13F filings
Market Risk
The company's profits depend heavily on financial market conditions like stock prices, interest rates, and trading activity. If markets decline sharply or become unstable, the company could lose significant money from its trading positions and see fewer clients making trades.
Credit Risk
The company lends money and extends credit to clients and counterparties. If borrowers cannot repay loans or if collateral (assets backing loans) loses value quickly, the company could suffer large unexpected losses. The company uses complex models to estimate these risks, but real economic changes could be worse than predicted.
Operational and Cybersecurity Risk
The company processes millions of transactions daily through complex technology systems. If systems fail, get hacked, or suffer data breaches, the company could lose money, face regulatory penalties, and damage its reputation. The company also relies on third-party technology providers, creating additional vulnerability.
Liquidity and Funding Risk
The company needs to borrow money continuously to fund its operations. If credit markets freeze, if the company's credit rating is downgraded, or if deposits flee, the company may struggle to raise funding and could be forced to sell assets at unfavorable prices.
Resolution and Capital Restrictions
As a systemically important bank, the company must maintain detailed plans for orderly shutdown and carry extra capital reserves. In a crisis, regulators could impose strict limits on dividends, stock buybacks, and capital distribution, or require asset sales or business divestitures.
10-K Item 1A · Risk Factors
·
Cash vs earnings
·
AR growth
·
Inventory
·
Share dilution
·
Debt trend
·
One-time charges
·
Goodwill
·
Customer conc.
Standard financial red-flag checks do not apply to banks, insurers, or REITs. Review regulatory capital ratios separately.
10-K · XBRL · Computed signals