Simon Property Group owns and operates physical places where people shop, eat, and spend time. It collects rent from the stores and restaurants inside its 212 American properties, which include 108 traditional malls, 70 Premium Outlets locations, and 16 Mills centers, spread across 38 states and Puerto Rico. Tenants pay a fixed base rent every month, and many also pay extra when their sales exceed a certain threshold. Simon also owns stakes in 42 properties outside the United States, a 22.2% share of Klépierre (a Paris-based shopping center company active in 13 European countries), and smaller positions in retail-related businesses. The diagram below traces where the money goes.
Five years of data tell a clear story about Simon's direction. Revenue has grown every single year, from $5.1 billion in 2021 to $6.4 billion in 2025. Occupancy at U.S. Malls and Premium Outlets sat at 96.4% at the end of 2025, and average base rent per square foot across the total portfolio rose to $60.97, up from $58.26 the year before. Those are strong operating numbers. The cash the business generates from its properties has also grown steadily.
Operating cash flow climbed from $3.6 billion in 2021 to $4.1 billion in 2025. Free cash flow, the money left after the basic costs of maintaining the portfolio, held steady at roughly $3.1 to $3.2 billion across all five years. That consistency is meaningful. It means the core business reliably generates cash even as the company spends on acquisitions and development.
The debt picture is more complicated. Net debt has not declined in a straight line. It fell from $24.8 billion in 2021 to $22.9 billion in 2024, which looked like gradual improvement. Then in 2025 it jumped to $27.6 billion, driven largely by the acquisition of the remaining 12% of The Taubman Realty Group in October 2025, which brought $3.1 billion of mortgage debt onto Simon's balance sheet all at once. The company's own risk filings put total debt at $28.6 billion as of December 2025. Servicing that debt consumes a significant portion of operating cash and limits how much flexibility the company has when conditions change.
Because Simon must pay out almost all of its taxable income to keep its REIT status, it cannot simply save profits to fund future deals. Every acquisition, every redevelopment, every new outlet center requires fresh borrowing or new equity issuance. That is not unusual in this industry, but it means the cost of debt matters enormously. Simon's effective borrowing rate rose to 3.87% at the end of 2025, up from 3.62% a year earlier, as older cheap debt gets replaced by newer, more expensive bonds.
The risks Simon faces are specific and well-documented. The biggest one is anchor tenants. Large department stores have been closing locations for years. When an anchor leaves a mall, foot traffic drops, smaller tenants lose customers, and the empty space is hard and expensive to fill. Simon's filings explicitly flag this as a high-severity risk. Related to this is tenant bankruptcy. When a retailer files for bankruptcy, it can cancel its lease, stop paying rent, and leave Simon waiting months or years to re-lease the space, often at lower rates.
Geography adds another layer of risk. Simon's most valuable properties are concentrated in Florida, California, Texas, and New York. Those states face elevated exposure to hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Simon's filings note that climate change could increase storm frequency and intensity in those regions, raising insurance costs and potentially disrupting operations at its most important locations.
Simon is also not a pure landlord anymore. It holds stakes in Catalyst Brands (a retail operating company), Rue Gilt Groupe (an e-commerce business), and Jamestown (a real estate management firm). These positions add complexity and some of them have lost value. In 2025, Simon recorded an $86.1 million pre-tax loss tied to restructuring inside Catalyst and write-downs of certain equity stakes. The core mall business generates predictable rent. The side investments do not.